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Militarisation, Industrialisation and the growth 




Paper presented at Conference on 'The Symphony Orchestra as Cultural 
Phenomenon', Institute of Musical Research, London, July 3rd, 2010 
  
 
Abstract: The Marxist writer Hans G Helms presented, in his article 'Zu den ökonomischen 
Bedingungen der neuen Musik', a theoretical model for the growth of the 19th century 
orchestra, by which the large-scale militarisation of European society during the period of the 
Napoleonic Wars provided a template for industrialisation, with the factory owner taking the 
role of the general, the workers that of ordinary soldiers. This model, according to Helms, was 
then adopted for the symphony orchestra, which grew in size and accorded a new type of 
quasi-dictatorial role for the conductor, culminating in the massive orchestral concerts 
organised by Berlioz in Paris in 1844 as part of the Exhibition of Industrial Products, in literal 
co-operation with the makers of musical 'machinery' such as Adolphe Sax. He also draws 
attention to the slower growth of the symphony orchestra in German-speaking lands due to 
the continuing prevalence of a form of society structured around many feudal principalities 
rather than fully developed industrial bourgeois society, at least prior to unification. In this 
paper, I present a sympathetic but critical examination of Helms's model, drawing upon other 
of my own recent research into the orchestra in the 19th century. Measuring Helms's model 
against a brief selection of documentary evidence of a few select examples, I argue that 
whilst the orchestra under Beethoven and Berlioz in particular does in large measure accord 
with his paradigms, the wider phenomenon was more diffuse, and in particular the more 
democratic ideals which informed the foundation of the Vienna Philharmonic and to some 
extent also the Berlin Philharmonic require a more flexible and nuanced model. 
 
 
It is quite remarkable, considering the sheer quantity of musicological research which 
has been undertaken into nineteenth-century music, how little, relatively speaking, has 
been written investigating the development of the symphony orchestra during this 
period. There are a number of specialised histories of specific institutions1, and more 
specialised studies such as those of Christoph Hellmut Mahling on the lives and social 
statuses of orchestral musicians in eighteenth and early-nineteenth century German 
lands, Daniel Koury on orchestral sizes and seating arrangements, William Weber on 
concert programming, or Rebecca Grotjahn on the role of the symphony and the 
institutions dedicated to its propagation2. To date, however the most comprehensive 
                                                 
1
 For example Cyril Ehrlich, First Philharmonic: A History of the Royal Philharmonic Society (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1996); D. Kern Holoman, The Société des Concerts du Conservatoire, 1828-1967 
(Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2004); Clemens Hellsberg, Demokratie der 
Könige: Die Geschichte der Wiener Philharmoniker  (Zürich, Vienna and Mainz: Schweizer 
verlagshaus, Kermayr & Scheriau & Schott, 1992); Richard von Perger and Robert Hirschfeld (eds), 
Geschichte der K.K. Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde Wien, two volumes (Vienna; Adolf Holzhausen, 
1912); Peter Muck, Einhundert Jahre Berliner Philharmonisches Orchester, three volumes (Tutzing; 
Hans Schneider, 1982); Irmgard Scharberth (ed), Gürzenich-Orchester Köln 1888-1988 (Cologne: 
Wienan Verlag, 1988); Historie en kroniek van het Concertgebouw en het Concertgebouworkest 1888-
1988, two volumes, edited H.J. Van Royen et al (Zutphen: De Walburg Pres, 1989).  
2
 Christoph-Hellmut Mahling, ‘Orchester und Orchestermusiker in Deutschland von 1700-1850’ 
Habilitation (Saarbrücken: 1971), also Mahling, 'The Origin and Social Status of the Court Orchestral 
Musician in the 18th and early 19th Century in Germany' in Walter Salmen (ed), The Social Status of the 
treatment of the history of the orchestra in general during this period remains Adam 
Carse's 1948 book The Orchestra from Beethoven to Berlioz3, which can be 
supplemented by the aforementioned and other similar literature4, together with 
related articles in collections compiled by Colin Lawson and Joan Peyser5. There is 
not yet a book on the nineteenth-century orchestra comparable to John Spitzer and 
Neal Zaslaw's monumental work on the orchestra up to 1815, though their own wider 
history of the orchestra in the most recent Grove suggests ways in which a second 
volume could be extremely fruitful. 
 
Of particular interest to me is the social, economic and ideological history of the 
orchestra during this time, a subject which is a feature if not a central concern for 
Carse. The subject is hardly mentioned in many major histories of 19th century music6 
despite the fact that many of these do attempt to varying degrees to situate music and 
music-making of that period within a wider social context. Reginald Nettel wrote a 
reasonable social history of the English orchestra in 18467, whilst Henry Raynor’s 
history of the orchestra, published in 1978, does attempt such a venture in 
international terms8. Both certainly presents some interesting insights, though not 
really constitute thoroughgoing scholarly investigations and lack reference to many of 
the detailed micro-studies which have been produced since.  
 
I do not propose to lay down a whole new social history of the nineteenth-century 
orchestra in a 20 minute paper, but would like merely to consider some interpretive 
                                                                                                                                            
Professional Musician from the Middle Ages to the 19 th Century, annotated and translated Herbert 
Kaufman and Barbara Reisner (New York: Pendragon Pres, 1983), pp. 219-264; Daniel J. Koury, 
Orchestral Performance Practices in the Nineteenth Century: Size, Proportions and Seating (Ann 
Arbor, MI: UMI Research Press, 1986); William Weber, The Great Transformation of Musical Taste: 
Concert Programming from Haydn to Brahms (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).; 
Rebecca Grotjahn, Die Sinfonie im deutschen Kulturgebiet 1850 bis 1875: ein Beitrag zur Gattungs- 
und Institutionengeschichte (Sinzig: Studio, 1998).  
3
 Adam Carse, The Orchestra from Beethoven to Berlioz: A history of the orchestra in the first half of 
the 19th century, and of the development of orchestral baton-conducting (Cambridge: . Heffer & Sons, 
1948). 
4
 For example Siegfried Borris, Die großen Orchester. Eine Kulturgeschichte (Hamburg: Claassen, 
1969) and Henry Raynor, The Orchestra: A History (London: Hale, 1978). 
5
 Joan Peyser (ed), The Orchestra: Origins and Transformations (New York: Charles Scribner‘s Sons, 
1986); Colin Lawson (ed), The Cambridge Companion to the Orchestra  (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003). 
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 For example Alfred Einstein, Music in the Romantic Era: A History of Musical Thought in the 19th 
Century (New York: Norton, 1947); Carl Dahlhaus, Nineteenth-Century Music, translated J. Bradford 
Robinson (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1989); Leon Plantinga, 
Romantic Music: A History of Musical Style in Nineteenth-Century Europe (New York and London: 
Norton, 1984); Georg Knepler, Musikgeschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts, two volumes (Berlin: 
Henschelverlag, 1961); Friedrich Blume, Classic and Romantic Music: A Comprehensive Survey, 
translated M.D. Herter (New York: Norton, 1970); Arnold Whittall, Romantic Music: A Concise 
History from Schubert to Sibelius (London: Thames and Hudson, 1987); or Rey M. Longyear, 
Ninteenth-Century Romanticism in Music, third edition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1988). 
Richard Taruskin, in The Oxford History of Western Music. Volume 3: The Nineteenth Century (New 
York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) – a book which is far more conventionally about 
'composers' and 'works' than, say, the more socially-oriented book of Dahlhaus - has a small amount to 
say in the context of Mendelssohn (pp. 172-173), Berlioz (pp. 323-324), Gottschalk (pp. 382-383), 
Liszt (pp. 418-419), Verdi (pp. 563-565), Johann Strauss II (p. 647), Brahms (pp. 690, 730), and a 
more extended section in the context of discussing the growth of concert halls (pp. 676-680). [Also 
check in Volume 4 for Elgar, etc.] 
7
 Reginald Nettel, The Orchestra in England: A Social History (London: Jonathan Cape, 1946).  
8
 Henry Raynor, The Orchestra: A History (London: Robert Hale, 1978).  
models and strategies, drawing upon a mixture of Marxist theory and other histories 
and historiography of the period, which might be pursued in the course of so doing, 
and test these against a few selected case studies.  
 
I just want to say something very briefly about historical method, and the categories 
of historical materialism which I favour and which are fundamental to the work I will 
be analysing. These are simply the Base: the economic structure of society and the 
relationships of different classes of individuals to the means of production, and the 
Superstructure, which incorporates most aspects of society such as institutions, laws, 
ideologies, culture, religion, etc. Marx and Engels first outlined these concepts in The 
German Ideology of 1845 as fundamental to bourgeois society, such that the base is 
the ultimate determinant of the superstructure, social organisation evolves out of 
production and commerce. One does not have to be a Marxist to believe that the 'base' 
can have a profound effect upon all aspects of society – indeed that type of thinking 
can be found in radically politically opposed figures such as Adam Ferguson and 
Adam Smith9. However, Marx warned on several occasions against an over-reductive 
approach, pointing out that both aspects might develop at different rates, with the 
superstructure lagging somewhat behind the base10. 
 
Engels, in various letters from the 1890s explaining further the theory of history that 
he believed Marx had never got round to articulating in full, poured scorn on those 
who adopted an un-nuanced one-way cause-and-effect model (suggesting that the 
superstructure can also impact upon the base), as well as emphasizing that ‘All history 
must be studied afresh, the conditions of existence of the different formations of 
society must be examined individually before the attempt is made to deduce them 
from the political, civil law, aesthetic, philosophic, religious, etc., views 
corresponding to them’. This is a comment I try to bear in mind when studying 
historical subjects like that under investigation here. 
 
[O]ur [Marx and Engels’] conception of history is above all a guide to study, not a lever for 
construction after the manner of the Hegelian. All history must be studied afresh, the conditions of 
existence of the different formations of society must be examined individually before the attempt is 
made to deduce them from the political, civil law, aesthetic, philosophic, religious, etc., views 
corresponding to them. [...] In this field we can utilize heaps of help, it is immensely big, anyone who 
will work seriously can achieve much and distinguish himself. But instead of this too many of the 
younger Germans simply make use of the phrase historical materialism (and everything can be turned 
into a phrase) only in order to get their own relatively scanty historical knowledge — for economic 
history is still as yet in its swaddling clothes! — constructed into a neat system as quickly as possible, 
and they then deem themselves something very tremendous.11 
 
Numerous 20th century Western Marxists, including Antonio Gramsci, Theodor 
Adorno and Louis Althusser, have theorised at length about ‘relatively autonomous’ 
                                                 
9
 As pointed out in Rob Beamish, ‘Base and Superstructure’, in George Ritzer (ed), The Blackwell 
Encyclopedia of Sociology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 
10
 The most important passages in question are the passage 'Civil Society and the Conception of 
History' in The German Ideology (1845), the Introduction to the Outline of the Critique of Political 
Economy (or Gründrisse) (1857) and the Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political 
Economy (1859). Marx's wider thoughts on 'vulgar political economy' can be found in the Theories of 
Surplus Value (1871). For an outline of the process leading from this concept to that of ‘vulgar 
Marxism’, see A.P. Lerner, ‘From Vulgar Political Economy to Vulgar Marxism’, Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 47, No. 4 (August 1939), pp. 557-567. 
11
 Engels to Conrad Schmidt, August 5th, 1890. See also Engels to Joseph Bloch, September 21st, 1890 
and Engels to Walter Borgius, January 25th, 1894.  
components of the superstructure.  But the German Marxist Hans G Helms in a 
relatively little-known but to my mind very important essay from 1971-72 entitled 
'Ökonomische Bedingungen der musikalischen Produktion' ('Economic Conditions of 
Musical Production') 12, takes a different reading which places greater emphasis upon 
the conditioning of the superstructure by the economic base, whilst emphasizing that 
the two might be 'out of step'. Helms is a German-Jewish writer, composer and 
theorist, who studied initially with Roman Jacobson, Max Horkheimer and Siegfried 
Kracauer, becoming involved in the Cologne musical scene in the late 1950s, and a 
founder member of the Sprache als Musik movement. From the 1960s, under the 
influence of Adorno, he became more focused upon Marxism, and investigated the 
roots of Nazism in 19th century German thought, in particular that of Max Stirner, as 
well as writing a Marxist critique of the Bundesrepublik13. 
 
The essay in question looks broadly at many ways in which economic conditions 
might have impacted upon musical production in the 19th and 20th centuries, , 
including questions of modernism and indeterminacy, or the 'proletarianisation of 
musicians', but I wish to focus on just a few sections relating to the history of the 19th 
century orchestra. The sub-text extracted here could be, I believe, potentially fruitful 
towards a wider social history of the orchestra, though is also in need of significant 
modifications and nuancing.  
 
Drawing upon a letter of Engels in which he speaks about philosophy and literature14, 
Helms derives a model for music whereby economic influences are ultimately the 
primary determinant, but within a field of musical material inherited from the past. 
(here the influence of Adorno's conceptions of the historical development of musical 
material, almost independently of the whims of particular musicians, would seem to 
very strong). He uses this to explain the predominance of the German states in the 
early 19th century, basing it upon a certain type of arrogant assumption of God-given 
musicality inherited by the Germans and Austrians, which in itself attracted 
composers from Spontini to Berlioz to German lands. As he puts it 'Beethoven and 
Gluck – in addition to economic considerations – attracted Berlioz to Germany, and 
Berlioz similarly acted as an attraction for Wagner to establish himself in Paris'. 
Helms also adds in the consideration of an 'international division of labour in the arts, 
which depends upon the economic conditions' and particular dynamics and laws 
within particular superstructural categories, as well as influences across the borders of 
such categories, as for example between literature and music. 
 
Beethoven and the Military as precursor of the Industrial 
 
It is with this in mind that Helms arrives at his first memorable historical analysis, of 
Beethoven’s Wellingtons Sieg of 1813. This is a piece which has invited re-
consideration, not least in terms of its role within Beethoven’s output, by a wide 
variety of recent scholars, but Helms’s interpretation is quite unusual: 
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 Hans G Helms, 'Ökonomische Bedingungen der musikalischen Produktion‘ (1971-72), in Helms, 
Musik zwischen Geschäft und Unwahrheit (Munich: edition text + kritik, 2001), pp. 27-82. 
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 Hans G Helms, Die Ideologie der anoymen Gesellschaft: Max Stirners “Einziger” und der 
Fortschritt des demokratischen Selbstbewußtsein von Vormärz bis zum Bundesrepublik (Cologne: 
DuMont Schauberg, 1966) and  Fetisch Revolution: Marxismus und Bundesrepublik  (Berlin: 
Luchterhand, 1969) 
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 Engels to Conrad Schmidt, October 27th, 1890. 
 On June 21, 1813, the English army, led by Wellington, defeated at the Battle of Vitoria the bulk of the 
French army under Josephe Bonaparte, who his brother Napoleon had appointed to be King of Naples 
in 1806 and King of Spain in 1808. Wellington’s victory was the beginning of the end of Napoleonic 
domination over Europe. Wellington’s victory also removed the last obstacle for the ascent of the 
bourgeoisie to control of the modern class society. Napoleon’s regime collapsed together with his 
continental blockade imposed against England, behind which the financial system on the continent had 
sheltered from England in the manner of a conservation park. The Industrial Revolution, which had 
already for decades in in England transformed feudal society into a capitalist class-based society, could 
in 1814, after Napoleon’s downfall, spread relatively unhindered and explosively through mainland 
Europe. This won for the bourgeoisie the economic basis for their future political domination. 15 
 
I find that rendition of history rather simplistic. First of all, it is a very narrow reading 
of the transformation of Europe under Napoleon to concentrate exclusively upon the 
blockades. Napoleonic rule itself brought new legal, constitutional and economic 
systems to much of Europe and played a significant role in weakening if not 
eliminating feudal power, Conversely, various analyses of societies in post-
Napoleonic continental Europe demonstrate that feudal princes were able to recapture 
some (though by no means all) of their power16. Also in many ways the English 
liberal economic model was never fully implemented in large swathes of continental 
Europe after 181517, an issue to which I will return. But let me first return to Helms. 
He goes on to draw attention to the fact that Beethoven originally wrote the work not 
for live players but for the panharmonicon, which made sounds imitating military 
bands,  invented by Johann Nepomuk Mälzel, who soon afterwards developed the first 
metronomes18. From this Helms notes Beethoven’s desires for a permanency and 
mechanical reproducibility, but also that to portray very experience of war required 
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 Helms, ‘Ökonomische Bedingungen’, p. 30. All translations my own 
16
 For some important recent scholarship on these subjects, see Alexander Grab, Napoleon and the 
Transformation of Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), especially pp. 19-33. This book 
synthesises various important earlier works such as Stuart Woolf, Napoleon's Integration of Europe 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1991); Geoffrey Ellis, The Napoleonic Empire (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 1991), Clive Emsley, The Longman Companion to Napoleonic Europe (Harlow: 
Longman: 1993); Philip Dwyer, Napoleon and Europe (Harlow: Longman, 2001).  
17
 See Ray Kiely, Industrialization and Development: A comparative analysis (London: UCL Press, 
1998), pp. 25-31 for a critique of the view of Britain serving as a ‘model’ for other industrialising 
countries. Following Eric Hobsbaum (in The Age of Revolution 1789-1848 (London: Weidenfield and 
Nicolson, 1962), pp. 45-47, 218, Kiely points out how French and Germans were ahead of Britain in 
terms of science, technology and education in the early 19th century., whilst the development of a mass 
market was limited in France, whose industry was more centered around luxury goods. Kiely argues 
from this that particular social relations, rather than simple entrepreneurship and technological 
innovation, made the British situation possible. Jeff Horn, in The Path Not Taken: French 
Industrialization in the Age of Revolution, 1750-1830 (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2006), pp. 2-
11, 211-248 makes a very strong case against Anglocentric models of industrial development, which 
see divergences from a market-based route as detours. Amongst the many factors Horn points out are 
that France remained the largest industrial nation until 1820 at least in terms of gross output, despite 
having to pay war reparations and having most of the eastern part of the country occupied. By contrast, 
an earlier study such as Christopher Harvie, Graham Martin and Aaron Scharf, Industrialisation & 
Culture 1830-1914 (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1970) is almost entirely Anglocentric in its 
choice of materials, omitting almost any primary sources such as might make a comparative analysis 
possible, whilst Tom Kemp, Industrialization in Nineteenth-Century Europe, second edition (London 
and New York: Longman, 1985) follows a model in which Britain is seen as a norm against which 
other countries are measured.  
18
 See Alice M. Hanson, Musical Life in Biedermeier Vienna  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1985), pp. 142-149. Hanson also draws attention to the number of military-inspired works of Schubert 
(most obviously the Marches militaires D733), and later the many works for military band by Johann 
Strauss Sr. and Jr. 
the introduction of elements of chance and contingency into the work and, more 
importantly for this discussion, argues for the phenomenon of the militaries of the 
Napoleonic era, unprecedented in size through the introduction of mass conscription, 
as a precursor of industrialization19, which to the best of my knowledge is an unusual 
view even within traditions of Marxist thought.  
 
One could say that Beethoven learned the principles of industrial mass production indirectly via 
bourgeois warfare, and indirectly through via the negative production and devastation, and reflected 
upon this musically, even though it hardly affected his feudal environment. This process was in 
keeping with the reality. As a harbinger of the Industrial Revolution in pre-industrial continental 
Europe, the instrument of power of the future dominant bourgeois class had already been established: 
the mass army created by Napoléon, against which the feudal mercenary armies of the European 
Princes were unsuccessful, until they had been converted into mass armies on the Napoleonic model by 
officers such as Gneisenau and Clausewitz. Two such mass armies, with their inherent coarse division 
of labour and inherent contradictions, meet one another in Beethoven’s composition, at least if one 
realizes the score and does not stick to a false, clichéd, conception.20 
 
During the wartime years the army of the Austrian Empire had become one of the 
largest in Europe, peaking at 650 000 men21, and it also developed military bands on 
the model of those employed by Napoleon22; Beethoven had written six works for 
military band in 1809-10, and would go on to write a further two after the Congress of 
Vienna.  
 
As a model for the orchestra, John Spitzer has traced how the use of army (and battle) 
metaphors can be traced well back into the eighteenth century, yet they receded in the 
early nineteenth23. But this, I would argue, says more about the way that the 
distinction between the military and the wider society had become blurred in an age of 
mass mobilisation. Helms does not however see this development in Beethoven as a 
fundamental break with the past – he argues that the music continues to proceed 
harmoniously, that the pre-established harmony and motivic working of German 
classicism are preserved and uses a metaphor of ‘apprentices and journeymen serving 
under the omniscient direction of the Master’ for the orchestras; even the division into 
two orchestras does not appear that radical to Helms, and cannot be interpreted in 
terms of industrial division of labour. 
 
The chief criterion is the coarse division of labour. Not only does Beethoven keep everything going on 
harmoniously; the pre-established harmony of German classicism is preserved; also the motivic 
working maintains a classical character, and the division of labour in the orchestra is still from the old 
craft, whereby all the apprentices and journeymen serving under the omniscient direction of the Master 
file into an internally coherent work, until it is successful. Similarly, the division of the orchestra into 
two groups is only a doubling of the basic scheme, and is not a product of the division of labour in an 
advanced stage of industrial development. Hence there is a distinctive dichotomy between a circuitous 
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 On the roll of mass militarisation of a whole society under Napoleon, and the role this had in creating 
the legend of the ‘nation-in-arms’ in France, lasting right up until the end of conscription in 1996, see 
Alan Forrest, The Legacy of the French Revolutionary Wars: The Nation-in-Arms in French 
Republican Memory (Cambridge: CUP, 2009), pp. 9-50. Hanson, Biedermeier, pp. 142-149, considers 
the relationship between the militarisation of Austrian society and the music produced during this 
period. 
20
 Helms, ‘Ökonomische Bedingungen’, p. 31.  
21
 Edward Sealsfield, Austria as it is: Or, Sketches of Continental Courts (London: Hurst, Chance, and 
Co, 1828), p. 224. 
22
 Hanson, Musical Life in Biedermeier Vienna , pp. 142-149. 
23
 John Spitzer, ‘Metaphors of the Orchestra – The Orchestra as a Metaphor’, The Musical Quarterly, 
Vol. 80, No. 2 (1996), pp. 234-264. 
insight into the statistical connections of industrial production and its repercussion upon the whole of 
society, and reflex responses to immediate experience in a pre-industrial environment, whereby the 
imaginary play with Mälzel’s machines – the masterful skill of the craftsman taken to absolute 
perfection, so to speak -  that should have led atemporal and ahistorical immutability to an end. 24 
 
Helms concludes from this the immanent self-development of the superstructure – in 
this case music – is therefore corrected by economically conditioned processes, whilst 
on the other hand the economic crisis in the directly experienced environment feeds a 
purely ideological evasion, namely to free from the arbitrary performance conditions 
by means of machines, but which itself in turn is also dependent upon the economic 
relations, which are experienced as a corrective.25 
 
Despite the problems in Helms’ somewhat over-simplistic historical model, the 
combination of industrial and military metaphors are powerful in this case, bringing 
together in a relatively clear form that which is approached elsewhere by others26. 
And this is all explored in the context of a work which, whilst now often derided, was 
very significant within Beethoven’s career: Wellingtons Sieg lifted Beethoven’s fame 
to an unprecedented level and he became rich from the proceedings of performances 
of this and other works in 1814 alone – a year which contained half of all the public 
performances held for Beethoven’s benefit throughout his lifetime27. As Barry Cooper 
has pointed out, in the years following the Congress Beethoven was apt to draw upon 
military metaphors to describe himself and his work, even comparing himself to 
Napoleon, his music fulfilling a similar conquering role throughout Europe as had 
Napoleon’s army28. With this would come an expansion of instrumental resources and 
orchestral sizes, a new degree of compositional control expressed through ever-more 
specific notation, and to some extent a more intensely mechanistic approach to tempo 
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 Helms, ‘Ökonomische Bedingungen’, pp. 31-32. 
25
 Ibid. p. 32. 
26
 William Kinderman, Beethoven (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 167. Kinderman goes on 
to describe Beethoven during this period as appearing to be ‘a pioneer of kitsch at the dawn of the age 
of mass production and commercial propaganda’ (p. 169). Tomachek had expressed dismay at the fact 
that in Wellingtons Sieg, ‘Beethoven, whom Providence has perhaps endowed with the loftiest throne 
in the realm of tone’ was ‘among the crassest of materialists’, though also recalled that ‘he himself has 
called the work a stupid thing’ (Sonneck, Beethoven, p 107). As late as 1823 Beethoven continued to 
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with a gushing letter to King George IV of England (Beethoven to King George IV of England, 
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copy to the same individual when he was Prince Regent (Barry Cooper, Beethoven, revised edition 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 256 – the Prince did not acknowledge this, but did pass it 
on to Sir George Smart, who organised the first London performance on February 10, 1815). 
Beethoven had hoped to present this score himself during a trip to London which never materialised – 
see Wegeler & Ries, Remembering Beethoven, pp. 133-137.  For a balanced consideration of the role of 
Wellingtons Sieg and Der glorreiche Augenblick in terms of Beethoven’s work and reputation as a 
whole, see Nicholas Cook, ‘The Other Beethoven: Heroism, the Canon, and the Works of 1813-1814’, 
in 19th Century Music, Vol. 27 No. 1 (2003), pp. 3-24. 
27
 David Wyn Jones, The Life of Beethoven (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 118-
124; Lewis Lockwood, Beethoven: The Music and the Life (New York: Norton, 2003), pp. 192-193.  
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 Barry Cooper, Beethoven (Oxford: Oxford University, 2000), Beethoven, p. 255. See also Maynard 
Solomon, Beethoven (London: Granada, 1980), pp. 296-322, Nicholas Mathew, 'History Under 
Erasure: Wellingtons Sieg, the Congress of Vienna, and the Ruination of Beethoven's Heroic Style', 
Musical Quarterly 89 (2006), pp. 17-61, and Thomas Röder, ‘Beethovens Sieg über die 
Schlachtenmusik Opus 91 und die Tradition der Battaglia’, in Helga Lühning and Sieghard 
Brandenburg (eds), Beethoven. Zwischen Revolution und Restauration (Bonn: Beethoven-Haus, 1989), 
pp. 229-258.  
and rhythm through the use of the metronome. Furthermore, the approach to 
orchestral writing in Wellingtons Sieg, in which the inner components are generally 
subjugated towards a totalizing, even terrifying, vision, is developed further in parts 
of the Seventh Symphony, especially the finale, and also the Ninth, with a degree of 
raw aggression that is rarely to be witnessed in earlier orchestral works, including the 
Eroica and Fifth Symphonies (the Storm movement of the Pastoral Symphony really 
belongs in a different category). 
 
There are other ways in which once might trace the development of militarisic 
elements within the ninteenth-century orchestra: military (sometimes Napoleonic) 
metaphors were employed to describe various conductors including Spontini, Berlioz 
and von Bülow29. Various instruments were increasingly incorporated into the 
orchestra from military bands, such as the E-flat clarinet, numerous percussion 
instruments and in general the use of larger, more prominent and unified wind and 
brass sections, such as became a major feature of works of Beethoven, Berlioz, 
Rimsky-Korsakov and Bruckner amongst others30  – all of whom were exposed to 
military bands from a young age and/or regularly throughout their lives. Though this 
is not the whole story – in the distinct tradition of orchestral writing to be found in 
Mendelssohn, Schumann and later Brahms (excepting occasional and 
uprepresentative works such as the Triumphlied), not to mention Fauré, Saint-Saëns 





The second interpretation provided by Helms I wish to consider concerns the 
relationship between Berlioz’s use of the orchestra and the industrial conditions of the 
time, but first I would like to give some background. From a relatively early age 
Berlioz developed a romantic fascination with Napoleonic militarism, possibly fed by 
memories of the ‘Hundred Days’, Napoleon’s return from exile in 1815, when the 
Emperor had passed near to Berlioz's childhood town. In the 1820s, following the 
posthumous publication of Napoleon’s memoirs, a new cult of the Emperor emerged 
in France and elsewhere in Europe, seeing him as a figure epitomising pride, 
republicanism and the people, in opposition to corrupt monarchies and regimes which 
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had emerged after the Congress31. During various travels to Italy in the early 1830s 
Berlioz rhapsodized about Napoleon in various letters, and contemplated writing a 
symphony portraying the triumphant return of Napoleon’s army from Italy32. In the 
end he did write his cantata Le Cinq Mai in 1835 to commemorate the death of 
Napoleon, and would probably have written a piece to celebrate the return of 
Napoleon’s ashes in 1840 if he had been given more time. Berlioz had also heard and 
been impressed by military bands from a young age and was later deeply taken by  
hearing an arrangement of his Francs-Juges overture for 320 wind and brass players 
by combined bands in Berlin in 184333. 
 
But at around this time remarks which Berlioz wrote about Ferdinand Hérold’s opera 
Zampa in the Journal des Débats in September 1835 make clear that he was far from 
wholly enamoured by the industrial productions of the time in Paris. He said that 
Hérold’s music was: 
 
just like those industrial products manufactured in Paris on foreign models and adapted with minor 
modifications. It is Parisian music. That is why it goes down so well with the Opéra-Comique 
audience, which in our view represents the middle class of the inhabitants of the capital, and why those 
artists and music-lovers whose radically different nature and taste and intelligence set them apart from 
the multitude think so little of it. 34 
 
But Berlioz's attitude was to change on this subject. 
 
Helms argues that Berlioz, whose music was made in earnest with the principles of 
industrial mass production, was the only composer able to transform economic 
conditions in the base into conditions of production in the superstructure35. Through 
his collaboration with instrument builders such as Adolphe Sax, Berlioz was able to 
ensure his workers got exactly the machines which enabled optimal work. But there 
was a difference – as Berlioz did not produce marketable goods, but simply 
superstructural phenomena, contents of consciousness, he still had to operate upon 
that narrow economic base defined not by supply and demand, but the rise and fall of 
public and private subsidies, and thus indirectly upon the cyclical movements of the 
economy36. Helms thus concludes that it is no coincidence that many of Berlioz’s 
most extravagant conceptions conceptions were written in the 1830s, when economic 
conditions appeared stable in the bourgeois France of Louis-Philippe37. 
 
On only one occasion, according to Helms, did Berlioz achieve an optimal 
correspondence between his work and the economic base – this was on August 1st 
1844. Here he employed over a thousand musicians (around half of which were 
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instrumentalists) for a performance of his Hymne à la France, and similar forces for 
movements from the Symphonie fantastique and Sinfonie funébre et triomphale on 
August 1, 1844 as part of the Exhibition of Industrial Products in Paris38. By this time 
the economic situation had already begun to worsen, and would culminate in the 
revolution of 1848-49, but at the beginning of the recessions existing profits were 
used speculatively rather than productively. Berlioz took advantage of this situation to 
organize this event privately, at huge financial risk to himself. In the event, the 
composer wrote rapturously afterwards of how the orchestra played like a unified 
whole, and the collective efforts of himself the other seven conductors (for the wind, 
percussion, and five for the choirs) worked in harmony, and the whole spectacle 
amazed the audience. For Helms, this was the closest a concert could get to the 
working of a mass factory, with various ‘plants’ coming together in the concert for the 
first time to produce the final product39. 
 
This is a brilliant and persuasive metaphor, but it is important to contrast this sort of 
spectacle with other orchestral developments during the periods of late Beethoven and 
Berlioz. First of all, the Philharmonic Society of London, founded by a group of 
musicians in 1813. This had no independent financial backers, and was funded 
entirely through subscriptions at the outset. In the first few years, members would not 
draw any salary, though this soon changed. There were various highly talented foreign 
players resident in London at the outset, having come there during the Napoleonic 
Wars, but many of these left after peace in 1815. From then onwards it was harder to 
obtain good players without paying more. Rehearsals were kept to a minimum, often 
just a play-through, and the results patchy. The orchestra did not receive any 
government subsidy. But it was profitable, and profits were invested in stock40. 
However, when a rule was passed  in the 1820s to use some dividends to provide 
death benefits to dependants, rather than reinvest them in the Society, it was attacked 
in the press as akin to ‘Broker’s Alley’41, and was rescinded soon afterwards. 
 
In 1828 was formed the Société des Concerts du Conservatoire in Paris, after the 
Viscount Sosthène de la Rochefoucald had lobbied the minister42. It was set up on a 
firm legal basis with a constitution that was fully ratified early into the July Monarchy 
period. All members had to be of French nationality and demonstrate ongoing or past 
affiliation with the Conservatoire. They elected officers annually, and divided profits 
amongst members43. These were generally low, and the conductor only received twice 
as much as others44. Furthermore, he had to submit numerous decisions for ratification 
by the members, including choices of repertoire45. The orchestra was also relatively 
conservative in terms of adopting new instrumental developments, little influenced by 
advances promoted in exhibitions and fairs46. 
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 After the first concert, François-Joseph Fétis described the students’ playing as being 
‘like the young draftees of the Empire, proud to fight beneath the gaze of the old 
veterans of the Revolution, and rivaling them in audacity and valor’47, and thought the 
concert would put an end to attacks on the Conservatoire in the press. 
 
And in Vienna in 1842, the Philharmonische Akademie was formed, drawing together 
players from the court opera orchestra (later the Vienna State Opera Orchestra).  
 
1. All members must also be members of the court opera orchestra (later the 
Vienna State Opera Orchestra). 
2. The orchestra is artistically, organisationally and financially autonomous; all 
decisions are reached on a democratic basis during the general assembly of all 
its members 
3. An administrative committee deals with the day-to-day management. 48 
 
None of these three institutions can easily be accommodated within a model that 
views this period primarily in terms of entrepreneurial capitalism. The orchestras in 
Paris and Vienna in particular reflect something of the far-from-laissez-faire 
principles which applied across much of Europe, with complexes of tariffs, 
regulations, subsidies and protections for producers49. Conversely, one might observe 
in such orchestras as those from the Philharmonic Society of Liverpool (founded 
1840) 50, Philharmonic Society of New York (founded 1842) 51, or the Hallé 
Orchestra (founded 1857) 52 a much greater degree of reliance upon external private 
funding and consequently lesser possibilities for internal democracy. Helms’ allusion 
to Berlioz in 1844 is in itself appropriate, but his wider model does little to 
incorporate these diverse possibilities. However, he does begin to approach such 
complexities in the context of Brahms. 
 
 
Brahms and Late 19th-Century Germany 
 
Helms goes on to argue that the nature of the progressive bourgeoisie in the last third 
of the 19th century consisted of ‘Rationally organized mass actions, from which result 
a homogenous sound, well-ordered and distinctive within itself, from which 
occasionally a solo voice comes to the fore like a human genius’53. It is from this 
perspective that he considers Brahms’s Ein deutsche Requiem, with the completion of 
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which Helms argues that ‘bourgeois music had already found its ultimate 
manifestation’ (endgültige Ausgestaltung) 54. 
 
Following the Franco-Prussian War, Helms argues that material conditions and 
bourgeois consciousness developed apart from each other – specifically the 
bourgeoisie surrended its determining influence upon political-economic development 
to individual capitalists, and capital began to focus on monopolistic projects. Thus the 
necessarily false consciousness of the bourgeoisie underwent a further ideological 
falsification. 55 
 
Adoping a model somewhat akin to the Sonderweg or ‘special path’ theory of German 
history56, Helms traces an unholy alliance between reactionary and noble-birth large 
landowners and rising monopoly capitalists, who found their requisite political-
economic concept in imperialism, and in the First World War literally used the 
proletariat to ‘fuel’ their portions of the world market57. 
 
Identifying a correspondence between bourgeois art and the situation of the 
bourgeoisie as a class by the 1860s, when Brahms was establishing himself, Helms 
asks why did such a phenomenon not occur in the 1830s or 1840s, through Berlioz or 
Charles Dickens? He answers that: 
 
As long as Germany was politically splintered and progressive bourgeois tendencies were obstructed 
by a reactionary politics of large and small minor princes and their noble entourages, then the typical 
apparatus of musical production remained the Meiningen-style court orchestras, with which Hans von 
Bülow himself struggled. After the bourgeois disaster of 1848-49, nominal bourgeois Prussian 
Ministers [Gottfried Ludolf] Camphausen [Minister of State at Berlin] and [David] Hansemann 
[Minister of Finance] were not able to win through against the reactionary East-Elbe Junkers. Those 
who should have encouraged the development of bourgeois culture remained embroiled within princely 
ceremony. The artistic avant-garde – Richard Wagner, George Weerth [writer and friend of Marx and 
Engels], Ferdinand Freiligrath [writer who like Weerth wrote for the Neue Rhenische Zeitung under 
Marx's editorship], George Herwegh [revolutionary poet who was involved in the 1848 revolutions] – 
were driven out from German lands. Those who stayed in the country – like William Raabe, Emanuel 
Geibl, Theodor Storm or Fritz Reuter – withdrew to remote places such as Husum, Stavenhagen and 
Eiseniach or idylls such as the Sperlingsgasse. Still in the 1860s and 1870s, when the frankly not 
indiscreet diaeris of the early bourgeois [Karl August] Varnhagen von Ense were published, there was 
a huge political scandal. 58 
 
I will return to Helms’s allusion to Bülow and Meiningen presently.  
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Helms goes on to describe the process by which the Junker Otto von Bismarck 
engineered a concordance between the bourgeoisie and the state through a sense of 
shared economic interests, leading to the wars against Denmark in 1864 and against 
Hannover and Austria in 1866, which he interprets as being about gaining territorial 
profits from territories west of the Elbe. He further argues that Brahms's home town 
of Hamburg benefited from the elimination of competition from the former Danish 
and Hanoverian cities of Altona and Harburg in terms of transit of goods, and points 
out that the Berlin-Hamburg and Cologne-Minden railways could only be completed 
when control was established over lands contested in these wars. All of this helped to 
consolidate Hamburg's position as the primary German port and commercial centre. 
 
But in terms of the relationship to Brahms and Ein deutsches Requiem, this is clearly 
not to do with Brahms writing a piece to celebrate the opening of a railway line (as 
Berlioz once did). Helms' hypothesis is as follows: 
 
Bourgeois consciousness, bolstered by its economic potential, also searched in music for  means and 
methods to enable its self-manifestation to be independent and distinct from that of the aristocracy. 
According to the model that had already produced the Viennese Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde in 1812  
- whereby in economically-underdeveloped Austria the aristocracy had earlier, as elsewhere, provided 
openings for the economically potent young bourgeoisie – in the second half of the century privately-
financed bourgeois orchestras developed everywhere, which displaced the traditional court orchestras 
or forced them to adapt themselves.59 
 
From such ventures, argues Helms, a distinctive spectrum of tone became the 
standard, such as Berlioz had found wanting during his concert tours in the 1830s and 
40s in Germany. Also, reparations after the Franco-Prussian War allowed a great 
number of these types of German orchestras to emerge.  
 
Helms overstates the situation in terms of privately-funded orchestras, I believe – 
equally important was the emergence of partially or wholly civically organised or 
funded orchestras such as those in Düsseldorf or Dresden. In terms of the early 
performances of the Requiem (which was performed a whole seventy-nine times 
between 1869 and 1876), it is difficult to generalise about the type of orchestras 
employed – it was as likely to be the scratch orchestra employed at Bremen for the 
first two performances or the statutory orchestras in Cologne or Leipzig who 
performed the work soon afterwards60, just as his symphonies might equally well be 
performed by the court orchestras in Karlsruhe and Meiningen, or the professional 
and democratic Vienna Philharmonic. 
 
It is generally dangerous to enter into over-essentialising conceptions of a whole 
class; nonetheless the picture given by Helms does concur with various evidence of 
Brahms’s own self-consciousness. As early as 1858 he had written to Clara 
Schumann: 
 
Art is a republic, you should take that as your motto. You are too aristocratic. I cannot expatiate on this, 
or at least only by word of mouth . . . . Do not place one artist in a higher rank, and expect the lesser 
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ones to regard him as their superior, as dictator. His gifts will make him a beloved and respected citizen 
of the above-mentioned republic, but will not make him consul or emperor. 61 
 
[Die Kunst ist eine Republik, des solltest Du mehr zu Deinem Spruch mochen. Du bist viel zu 
aristokratisch. Ich kann Dir das nicht lang ausführen, aber mündlich einmal . . . Weise nicht einem 
Künstler einen höhern Rang an und verlange nicht von Kleinern, sie sollen ihn als Höhern, als Consul 
ansehen. Durch sein Können wird er ein geliebter und geachteter Bürger der besagten Republik, aber 
kien Consul oder Imperator.] 
 
This probably reflected his dissatisfaction at the appointment he held at that point at 
the Court of Count Leopold III in Detmold, which he had taken up the previous year; 
in October 1859 he described the choral society as being 'larded with nobility, without 
a necktie'62 whilst speaking fondly of the women's chorus in Hamburg which 'still 
exists as a small republic'63. It is clear from various of Brahms's correspondence from 
this time that he felt considerably more at home in the bourgeois city-state of 
Hamburg, which adopted a republican constitution in 1860, the year Brahms re-settled 
there, than in the principality of Detmold. 
 
But I find Helms’s model less convincing when considering the Meiningen Orchestra, 
who achieved a whole new level of musicianship and renown under the directorship 
of Bülow, who became Kapellmeister from 1880 to 188464. Bülow established what 
he called the ‘Meiningen principles’65, involving as many as six rehearsals per concert 
(thus decreasing productivity in sharp distinction to, say, English practice) and 
achieved a new level of synchronization of dynamics, bow strokes and articulation 
amongst the players, and taking the orchestra on numerous tours. This was all 
possible with a court orchestra .  Bülow was granted favourable working conditions 
by Crown Prince Georg II; he led them to a level of renown which matched that of its 
touring theatre66. The touring practices did generate discontent amongst players, who 
were thus unable to obtain further secondary income for their families, leading to a 
planned strike which was only avoided through an intervention on the part of the 
Crown Prince (with Bülow’s wholehearted approval), who sacked the principal 
flautist, identified as one of the ring-leaders67. Yet it was this orchestra which had an 
influence arguably exceeding that of many of those privately-funded institutions 
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From the Bilesche Kapelle to the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra 
 
One of these was the Bilesche Kapelle founded in the same year (1868) as Brahms 
completed his Requiem. Benjamin  Bilse was conductor, manager and owner of the 
orchestra he had founded in 1868 and put on a very large number of concerts in Berlin 
– three to four a week – with a mixture of popular and more 'classical' music, even 
doing dance music on some evenings. He conducted mechanically, paid his musicians 
a pittance whilst expecting many hours of work from them, whilst showing them little 
respect, and would even turn his back to them during concerts68. Nonetheless the 
orchestra was very successful and its playing held in high regard by many. In January 
1882 Bülow visited Berlin to give several concerts with the Meiningen Orchestra, 
which impressed many of Bilse’s players in contrast to what they were used to. After 
Bilse made clear he expected them to travel fourth class on long train journeys to East 
Prussia and Poland, a group of players protested. Bilse would not budge, so 57 of the 
players left to form their own orchestra, at first called the ‘former Bilesche Kapelle’, 
soon afterwards, soon afterwards Philharmonische Konzerte, later the Berliner 
Philharmoniker. They continued in direct competition with Bilse’s outfit, but 
eventually won out69. 
 
The Berlin Philharmonic created their own board of directors, would use box-office 
receipts to pay themselves, and created a constitution in which each player would 
assume personal financial liability for the orchestra; they could also hire and fire 
conductors. The generally young players were prepared to play up to six concerts a 
week for a salary of 150 marks per month70. 
  
After early financial problems, the new orchestra paid off debts through touring, and 
garnering private contributions from the von Mendelssohn and von Siemens families.  
They also found a fine manager, Hermann Wolff, who managed to persuade von 
Bülow to take over the position of conductor. He did so on condition he could pare 
down the repertoire to be more select, have shorter concerts, and more time for 
rehearsals – developing the principles he had established at Meiningen. Long concerts 
were popular, but Bülow wanted to put his own musical preferences first. He was able 
to further exploit the platform and audience afforded him through his directorship of 
the orchestra to give didactic political speeches (on vaguely nationalistic and 
republican themes) from his podium to the audience71.  
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And this history coincides with the massive industrial and other growth of Berlin, 
whose population increased from 400 000 in 1848 to four million in 191472. And 
furthermore, during the 1880s, Bismarck was able to introduce some limited social 
reforms aimed at quelling wider socialist yearnings, including sickness benefits, 
accident insurance, disability allowances and pensions, a considerable amount of time 
before equivalent measures were introduced in much of the rest of the developed 
world73. They were extremely modest by contemporary standards, but nonetheless 
paved the way for late-20th century social democratic reforms in Germany and 
elsewhere after the calamities and fascist horror that resulted from world economic 
collapse. And similarly a variety of models for the orchestra as civic institutions, 
funded in large measure by public subsidy, have become the norm from the second 
half of the 20th century in Germany and elsewhere in continental Europe, as distinct 
from the Anglo-American models which rely to a much greater extent upon private 
sponsorship and box-office receipts. These institutions stand outside of the dichotomy 
between court orchestras and privately-funded bourgeois groups as posited above by 
Helms, just as did the Vienna Philharmonic. A model which cannot satisfactorily 
account for these is in need of significant modification, as is the conception of post-





The models provide by Helms are to my mind compelling and provide a good basis 
for the development of a wider social history of the 19th century symphony orchestra. 
Nonetheless, they need to be balanced against other evidence (and sometimes against 
slightly less didactic readings of the history of the period) suggesting modified and 
regulated forms of industrial capitalism, elements of something approaching 
‘workers’ democracy’ within orchestras, and and a view of industrialisation which 
does not necessarily centre around the Anglo-Saxon model. The result of such a 
nuancing process would provide a strong foundation for a new approach to writing the 
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